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CRY HAVOC: ARE INCOMPETENT PRIVATE MILITARY
COMPANIES RUINING THE DEFENSE BASE ACT?
WILLIAM BURKE*
ABSTRACT
The Defense Base Act (“DBA” or “Act”) provides a no-fault, insurancebacked workers’ compensation mechanism for compensating private security
contractors who are injured overseas. Critics of the Act allege that it should
be fundamentally altered or replaced because combat zone work is uninsurable, the Act’s compensation is insufficient, and it is less efficient than the
alternatives. This Note argues that, on the contrary, the DBA insurance market is functional and improving, its benefits are sufficient when viewed in
combination with contractors’ other compensation, and it is a far more efficient compensation system than is offered by tort litigation. The flaws cited by
the DBA’s critics are more likely a result of problems that are extrinsic to the
Act. Not least of these are the risks posed by some inexperienced, unprofessional private military companies that are more dangerous for their
employees and more likely to attempt to short-circuit the Act than are
better-credentialed private military companies. Existing trade associations
that carefully credential their members offer a potential solution: amend
contracting regulations to require private security contractors to be certified
by third parties like the International Stability Operations Association.
This would allow the government to exclude the most dangerous actors
from the market and send a strong standardizing signal to the industry.
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INTRODUCTION
On March 30, 2004, four Americans working as contract security guards
in Iraq were escorting a small convoy of flatbed trucks for a company that
was providing logistics services to the U.S. Army.1 The four contractors got
lost in the city of Fallujah where local insurgents ambushed, beat, and killed
all four, then hanged two.2 Pictures of the contractors’ desecrated bodies went
viral, depicting “scenes reminiscent of Mogadishu circa 1993.”3 But when
the administrator of the deceased contractors’ estates sued the contractors’
employer for wrongful death and fraud, the result was a protracted and
procedurally complex court battle that did not end until 2011, with all of the
plaintiffs’ claims dismissed.4
When private security contractors5 are injured, they fall under the
Defense Base Act’s workers’ compensation scheme.6 The DBA provides
substantial benefits to injured contractors and death benefits to their survivors if they are killed, but in the wake of the Fallujah incident, many critics
of the current regulatory regime have argued that the DBA’s exclusive remedy is insufficient.7 Much analysis has gone into the Act’s problems, but none
of it has explored the economic links between the problems the DBA’s critics
identify and the other major line of criticism aimed at private military contractors (PMCs): the lack of accountability for PMC misconduct.
This criticism reached fever pitch after an incident that occurred in
Baghdad, Iraq, in September of 2007.8 A convoy of private security contractors
1

In re Blackwater Sec. Consulting, LLC, 460 F.3d 576, 581 (4th Cir. 2006).
Id.; see also Steve Fainaru & Saad al-Izzi, U.S. Security Contractors Open Fire in
Baghdad, WASH. POST (May 27, 2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content
/article/2007/05/26/AR2007052601394.html.
3
Michael N. Schmitt, Humanitarian Law and Direct Participation in Hostilities by
Private Contractors or Civilian Employees, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 511, 515 (2005); see also Mark
Calaguas, Note, Military Privatization: Efficiency or Anarchy?, 6 CHI.-KENT J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 58 (2006).
4
Blackwater Sec. Consulting, LLC v. Nordan, No. 2:06-CV-49-F, 2011 WL 237840, at
*11 (E.D.N.C. Jan. 21, 2011) (confirming arbitrator’s dismissal of all claims with prejudice).
5
“Private security contractors,” like the four killed in Fallujah, generally work as
independent contractors for “Private Military Companies” or “PMCs.” Calaguas, supra note 3,
at 59–60. The companies themselves are also often referred to as private security contractors
or companies (PSCs). Id. They are sometimes also called Private Military Firms (PMFs)
or Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs). Id. For clarity, this Note will refer to
the companies as PMCs and the individual contractors as either “contractors” or “private
security contractors.”
6
Division of Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation (DLHWC), U.S. DEP’T
OF LABOR (last visited Nov. 19, 2014), http://www.dol.gov/owcp/dlhwc/ExplainingDBA
.htm#1.
7
See infra Part II.B.
8
Kim Gamel, Iraqi Police Say Security Contractors Open Fire in Western Baghdad,
Killing at Least 9, ASSOCIATED PRESS, (Sept. 16, 2007, 11:14 PM), available at https://
2
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working for Blackwater,9 the same PMC that employed the four killed in
the Fallujah incident, opened fire on civilians in Nisoor Square, killing
nine and wounding at least a dozen more.10 The incident spawned a wave of
scholarly legal writing calling for greater post hoc accountability for PMCs
and contractors, whether through tort liability or criminal sanctions.11 For
the most part, PMC critics’ calls for more post hoc accountability have
been answered.12
One of the Coalition Provisional Authority’s many blunders was the
decision to exempt PMCs from criminal liability for their actions in Iraq.13
Congress solved that issue via the National Defense Authorization Act of
2007, which contains a provision subjecting PMCs to the Uniform Code of
Military Justice while working under military command.14 In addition, under
the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, all private security contractors
supporting the Department of Defense (DoD) in overseas contingency
operations are subject to U.S. criminal jurisdiction.15 Finally, the new Status
of Forces Agreement between the United States and Iraq subjects PMCs
operating there to Iraqi criminal law.16
advance.lexis.com/document/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=54ebe9e8-2147-4b12-8994-80b34
af5aa01&pddocfullpath=%2Fshared%2Fdocument%2Fnews%2Furn%3AcontentItem%3A4
PP0-K4X0-TWCX-N17F-00000-00&pddocid=urn%3AcontentItem%3A4PP0-K4X0-TWCX
-N17F-00000-00&pdcontentcomponentid=138211&ecomp=vhyg&earg=sr2&prid=96f6b
9dd-234f-4491-90f0-0809fea3911a.c.
9
The PMC formerly known as “Blackwater” has been through a number of fundamental
transformations since these and the many other ugly incidents involving the company were
identified. For a discussion of how the company’s journey from “Blackwater” to “Academi”
shows that it is possible to distinguish between good and bad PMCs, see infra Part IV.
10
Gamel, supra note 8.
11
See, e.g., Jonathan Finer, Holstering the Hired Guns: New Accountability Measures
for Private Security Contractors, 33 YALE J. INT’L L. 259 (2008); Oliver R. Jones, Implausible Deniability: State Responsibility for the Actions of Private Military Firms, 24
CONN. J. INT’L L. 239, 240 (2009); Craig S. Jordan, Who Will Guard the Guards? The
Accountability of Private Military Contractors in Areas of Armed Conflict, 35 NEW ENG.
J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 309 (2009).
12
Finer, supra note 11, at 259–65.
13
See Kristine Huskey & Scott Sullivan, United States: Law & Policy Governing Private
Military Contractors After 9/11, in MULTILEVEL REGULATION OF MILITARY AND SECURITY
CONTRACTORS: THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL, EUROPEAN AND DOMESTIC
NORMS 350 (Christine Bakker & Mirko Sossai eds., 2012) (discussing Coalition Provisional
Order 17).
14
MOLLY DUNIGAN, VICTORY FOR HIRE: PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES’ IMPACT ON
MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS 6–7 (Stanford Univ. Press 2011).
15
18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1361–67 (West 2013).
16
SHAWN ENGBRECHT, AMERICA’S COVERT WARRIORS: INSIDE THE WORLD OF PRIVATE
MILITARY CONTRACTORS 11–13 (Potomac Books, Inc. 2011); Huskey & Sullivan, supra
note 13, at 351–52.
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But despite this progress on PMC accountability, there has yet to be any
significant action on PMC competence.17 The Department of State (DoS) has
introduced a more rigorous credentialing process that has eliminated some
of the most egregious problems.18 Additionally, DoD and DoS signed a
Memorandum of Agreement (MoA) in December 2007, in the aftermath of
the Nisoor Square massacre, that provided some rules for conducting background checks on private security contractors, but contained no real competency requirements.19 The only competency requirement in the MoA is
that armed contractors must pass the Army’s basic marksmanship test.20 If
contractors cannot clear this very low hurdle, however, the embassy’s regional security officer is permitted to waive it.21 When the MoA was implemented, its clear intent was not to vet or control military provider firms,
but rather to try to keep track of what they were doing.22
The lack of a mandatory competence-based certification for PMCs leaves
the market open to fly-by-night companies that employ unqualified contractors who are unprepared for the pressures of combat.23 These individuals
are more likely to get themselves hurt or killed, or to lose control and inflict
civilian casualties. When the demand for PMC services outstripped the supply of competent providers, small, informally organized PMCs flooded into
Iraq and Afghanistan to fill the gap.24 Unlike their experienced, professional
predecessors, these new PMCs tended to employ the least qualified candidates, who are “always the first to come unglued when the bullets start[]
flying.”25 As one former private security contractor and PMC CEO explains,
“when the call came for Iraq, the amateurs trampled the old guard in the stampede to the trough of free taxpayer money.”26 As a result, these under-qualified
17

C. Douglas Goins, Jr., Gregory L. Fowler, & Taavi Annus, Regulating Contractors in
War Zones: A Preemptive Strike on Problems in Government Contracts, 07-3 BRIEFING
PAPERS 1, *15 (West 2007).
18
ENGBRECHT, supra note 16, at 13.
19
Memorandum of Agreement between Dep’t of Def. & Dep’t of State, available at http://
prhome.defense.gov/Portals/52/Documents/PR%20Docs/DOS-DOD%20Memo%20of %20
Agreement%20on%20Protection%20and%20Evacuation.pdf.
20
Id. at 5.
21
Id.
22
Author’s personal experience while assigned to the headquarters staff in Baghdad and
assisting in the process of creating the small entity tasked with implementing the MoA for DoD.
23
See Deborah Avant, Think Again: Mercenaries, FOREIGN POLICY (July 1, 2004),
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2004/07/01/think_again_mercenaries.
24
John Riley & Michael Gambone, Men with Guns, 28 WIS. INT’L L.J. 39, 45 (2010).
25
ENGBRECHT, supra note 16, at 41. Engbrecht provides a number of anecdotes describing
this phenomenon in graphic, heart-wrenching detail, driving home again and again the point
that inexperienced, inadequately trained contractors are the ones most likely both to get
themselves or others killed and to commit atrocities. Id. at 100–22.
26
Id. at 7.
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PMCs rapidly amassed a long list of both contractor and civilian casualties.27
Addressing the full sweep of this problem is beyond the scope of this Note.
Instead, this Note will focus narrowly on the controversy over the DBA
and argue that, contrary to the weight of academic argument, its problems are
not symptoms of inherent deficiency. The Act is the best response to a difficult problem, and any struggles are more likely because its compensation
infrastructure has been overloaded and short-circuited by the bad actors that
have proliferated in the industry since its explosive growth began early in the
Iraq War.28 Regardless of any new post hoc accountability measures, the
reality of the market is that demand for private security services still well exceeds supply,29 so even the least qualified candidates and companies can find
employment.30 Some critics of PMCs would have the government address
this problem from the demand side, by simply reducing or even discontinuing its use of PMCs altogether.31 But this is too drastic: PMCs provide
real fiscal and strategic benefits that make a ban inadvisable.32
Instead, by requiring basic competency certification, the government can
mitigate, and could eventually eliminate, many of the remaining problems associated with its use of PMCs. In the short term, the current market failure
conditions would persist, but the worst consequences would be avoided by
the ban on unqualified contractors. Prices would go up, but in the long run,
this would exert pressure on other PMCs to reform in order to remain in or
re-enter the market, thereby increasing the supply of qualified PMCs and contractors overall. With fewer incompetent and unethical PMCs in the market,
private security contract work would be safer, leading to a lower volume of
DBA claims and lower DBA insurance premiums, and the PMCs remaining
27

Id., at 20, 41; see infra Part IV.
ENGBRECHT, supra note 16, at 111–12 (explaining that by the end of 2004, there were
over 100 PMCs operating in Iraq.).
29
Avant, supra note 23 (“The market pressures, technology, and social change of a
globalized world create multiple demands that national militaries have difficulty meeting.”).
30
See ENGBRECHT, supra note 16, at 110–11 (arguing that economic pressures
associated with recruiting and transporting replacements prevented many PMCs in Iraq
from replacing incompetent or even dangerous contractors).
31
See, e.g., Joshua P. Nauman, Civilians on the Battlefield: By Using U.S. Civilians in
the War on Terror, Is the Pot Calling the Kettle Black?, 91 NEB. L. REV. 459, 497 (2012)
(recommending that the U.S. cease using PMCs for combat-related tasks); see also Charles
Tiefer, The Iraq Debacle: The Rise and Fall of Procurement-Aided Unilateralism As a
Paradigm of Foreign War, 29 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1, 31 (2007) (arguing that PMCs are too
expensive and not as effective as regular military forces).
32
This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that few countries have seriously considered
imposing such a ban. See LINDSEY CAMERON & VINCENT CHETAIL, PRIVATIZING WAR 676
(2013). The only example the authors cite is a draft bill being considered by pacifist
Switzerland. Id.
28
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in the market would be more likely to fulfill their obligations under the Act,
leading to more reliable and prompt compensation for injured contractors.
Part I of this Note provides a brief overview of the PMC industry, the DBA
injury compensation mechanism, and the main lines of criticism of the Act.
Part II responds to arguments that combat zone activities are uninsurable and
that DBA compensation is insufficient. Part III focuses on the argument that
the DBA is an inefficient system of compensation. Part IV offers an alternative explanation for the DBA’s apparent problems. Part V concludes with a
discussion about regulatory action that could address this problem.
I. PMCS AND THE DBA
PMCs provide a variety of military support services, ranging from feeding
and supplying troops, to technical support for information and weapons systems, to armed security support.33 Despite some concern over their use,34
PMCs have been part of the American way of war since 1775.35 Immediately
following the end of the Cold War, however, the United States began to use
PMCs more and more frequently; now it uses them more than ever before.36
The end of the bipolar conflict between the United States and the Soviet
Union ushered in a much more complex international security environment.37
Non-state actors emerged as both threats and targets, as increasingly powerful
and active drug cartel and terror networks found international non-governmental organizations and multinational corporations to be relatively soft targets.38
At the same time, post-Cold War military demobilizations resulted in a large
supply of trained, experienced, and professional soldiers willing and able
to step into the security gap.39 Western governments, riding an ideological
33

See Goins, Fowler, & Annus, supra note 17, at *4.
See infra Parts II.A and III.C.
35
Matthew Underwood, “Jealousies of A Standing Army”: The Use of Mercenaries in
the American Revolution and Its Implications for Congress’s Role in Regulating Private
Military Firms, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 317, 325 (2012); see also Robert H. Patton, The Unlikely
Role of a Patriot Pirate Navy, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (June 27, 2008), http://www
.usnews.com/news/national/articles/2008/06/27/the-unlikely-role-of-patriot-pirates (describing the Colonial reliance on privateer naval forces in the Revolutionary War). The similarity
between Colonial privateers and modern PMCs is underscored by the fact that both Thomas
Paine and George Washington were shareholders in proto-corporate privateering ventures.
DUNIGAN, supra note 14, at 6–7.
36
Peter W. Singer, Outsourcing War, Foreign Affairs, BROOKINGS (March/April
2005), available at http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2005/03/01usdepartment
ofdefense-singer.
37
Id.
38
Riley & Gambone, supra note 24, at 47.
39
Id. at 43–44; see also DUNIGAN, supra note 14, at 2–3, 8–9 (attributing the emergence
of the modern PMC to the post–Cold War “peace dividend”).
34
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wave favoring privatization of government services quickly saw that they
could save billions of dollars by outsourcing traditional military support
functions to the emerging PMC industry40 and their use expanded rapidly
throughout the 1990s.41
The model of using these contractors as proxy forces for U.S. national
security and foreign policy missions began in earnest in 1994 with the Clinton
Administration’s decision to surreptitiously assist Croatia in its fight against
Serbia by allowing Military Professional Resources, Inc. (MPRI) to deploy
contractors to Croatia.42 MPRI was ostensibly in Croatia to lead a course
called the “Democratic Transition Assistance Program,” aimed at enhancing
the Croatian military’s understanding of the need to subordinate itself to civilian control in the service of democracy.43 Whatever MPRI actually taught
the Croatian Army about civil-military relations, it is evident that it also
shared some more practical lessons as well: only nine months after DTAP’s
inception, the Croats launched an offensive that employed American-style
maneuver warfare doctrine, including “[c]lose coordination of armor, airpower, and artillery,” to win back in the span of one week all of the territory
their erstwhile incompetent army had lost to the Serbs since 1991.44
At the same time, DoD became aware of potential savings PMCs could
offer in logistics support.45 Partly in response to the logistics contracting
chaos of the 1991 Gulf War, DoD awarded the first five-year comprehensive
Logistics Civil Augmentation Program contract (LOGCAP I) to Brown &
Root Services in 1992,46 freeing DoD to shift more of its resources from logistics and support functions to those more directly related to warfighting.47 Brown & Root went on to support forward-deployed American
40

DUNIGAN, supra note 14, at 10–11. Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney commissioned
a Defense Science Board study of privatization options in 1996 that found that an aggressive shift to outsourcing could save the DoD between seven and twelve billion dollars. Id.
A subsequent study by the Government Accountability Office found that this projection was
overstated by as much as 30 percent, however, this still left a projected savings per annum
of at least five billion dollars under peacetime conditions. Id.
41
Riley & Gambone, supra note 24, at 44–45 (stating that the U.S. troop-to-contractor
ratios for World War I, World War II, and Vietnam were, respectively, 24:1, 7:1, and 5:1.);
see also Huskey & Sullivan, supra note 13, at 334–35 (stating that in Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. troop-to-contactor ratios have hovered around 1:1 with occasional spikes as
high as 1:1.29 in Iraq and 1:1.42 in Afghanistan); Avant, supra note 23 (describing that while
PMCs are not new, their use has nevertheless markedly increased).
42
ENGBRECHT, supra note 16, at 78.
43
Id.
44
Id. at 78–79.
45
Id. at 73–75.
46
Id. at 74–75. See also Riley & Gambone, supra note 24, at 45.
47
Riley & Gambone, supra note 24, at 45 (quoting a senior officer in Baghdad explaining:
“We fight the war, and they do the shit work.”).
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forces in Somalia, Kuwait, Rwanda, and Bosnia, building a substantial record
of successes.48
As the distinction between MPRI and Brown & Root’s activities suggests,
the companies that emerged in this environment were not all the same.49
Different companies do different things, giving rise to different risks of injury
and different legal questions regarding DBA insurance coverage.50 “Military
Provider Firms” that provide armed operatives for defensive combat and security services51 are the most relevant type here because armed security is the
most dangerous contract task, and these firms accordingly bear the greatest
risk of contractor injuries and deaths.
When regular military service members are injured, they enjoy substantial
health and compensation benefits provided by the military services and the
Veterans Administration,52 but they are barred from suing the government by
the doctrine of sovereign immunity.53 Private security contractors, aside from
the DBA’s provisions, are in the opposite position, with no care or compensation, but also no bar against suit.54 Thus, with more contractors suffering more
injuries, the government would have exponentially greater exposure to the
costs associated with tort suits arising out of those injuries.55 Fortunately,
48

ENGBRECHT, supra note 16, at 74–75. In 1997, DynCorp, one of the other most
prominent PMCs, won the bidding for the LOGCAP II contract which ran from 1997–2002,
but there were no major deployments calling for LOGCAP support during that period. Id. In
2001, Brown & Root, soon to become Kellogg, Brown & Root, or KBR, won the bid for
LOGCAP III in large part on the strength of its demonstrated success during the much more
active LOGCAP I period. Id. LOGCAP III’s period of performance was from 2002 to 2007.
Id. However, with the Iraq War “surge” at its height in 2006–2007, the negotiations, bidding,
and implementation of LOGCAP IV were somewhat delayed and KBR’s LOGCAP III
contract was extended. Author’s personal experience while serving as a Management Analyst
in the Multinational Force, Iraq, Resource Management directorate in Baghdad, Iraq.
49
SINGER, supra note 36, at 2.
50
Id.
51
DUNIGAN, supra note 14, at 12–13 (citing PETER W. SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS:
THE RISE OF THE PRIVATIZED MILITARY INDUSTRY 93–97 (2003)). Singer’s typology breaks
PMCs down into three categories: “Military Support Firms” that provide only non-lethal
logistics support, “Military Consultant Firms” that provide operational analysis and training
services, and “Military Provider Firms.” Id.
52
Hugh Barrett McClean, Defense Base Act Insurance: Allocating Wartime Contracting
Risks Between Government and Private Industry, 41 PUB. CONT. L.J. 635, 645 (2012).
53
See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950) (“[T]he Government is not liable
under the Federal Tort Claims Act for injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise out of
or are in the course of activity incident to service.”).
54
See David Isenberg, Thinking of Suing a Private Military Contractors? There May Be
a Way ..., TIME (Jan. 7, 2013), http://nation.time.com/2013/01/07/thinking-of-suing-a-pri
vate-military-contractor-there-may-be-a-way/ (discussing sovereign immunity doctrine and
the doctrine’s applicability to private military contractors.).
55
See, e.g., McClean, supra note 52, at 639 (“Between January and June 2010, more
military contractors than uniformed service members were killed in Afghanistan and Iraq.”).
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this problem was apparent long before the current PMC boom: in July 1941,
in order to avoid the uncertainty and great expense associated with insuring
against and litigating contractor tort suits, the Secretary of War asked
Congress to create a no-fault compensation mechanism to compensate injured contractors.56 Congress did so by passing the Defense Base Act,57 which
extends the insurance-based workers’ compensation scheme of the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA) to government
contractors injured overseas.58
In 1958, Congress amended the DBA to extend its coverage to workers
performing service contracts overseas but not injured while actually on a U.S.
military base, expressly including armed private security contractors injured
by intentional third party attacks.59 The 1958 enactment also included the
stand-alone War Hazards Compensation Act (WHCA). The WHCA essentially
steps in to cover those aspects of PMCs’ employment which are uninsurable
or are only insurable at great cost, but where continued PMC participation is
important enough to the government to warrant its special protection—for
example, personal security details for diplomats and intelligence officers.60
The DBA requires employers either to obtain adequate insurance for their
contractors and employees or to obtain Department of Labor (DoL) certification as a qualified self-insurer.61 It provides for a no-fault compensation
system in which “the defenses of ‘fellow servant’, ‘assumption of risk’, and
‘contributory negligence’ are not available” to an employer.62 Instead, the
DBA extends the LHWCA’s workers’ compensation system to compensate
contractors for any “accidental injury or death arising out of and in the course
of employment[.]”63 For the purposes of the Act, “accidental” means an
unexpected and undesired event,64 including third parties’ intentional acts.65
56

O’Keeffe v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 338 F.2d 319, 322 (5th Cir. 1964).
42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1651–54 (West, 2013) [hereinafter DBA or the Act].
58
33 U.S.C.A. §§ 901–50 (West, 2013) [hereinafter LHWCA].
59
See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Robb, Workers’ Compensation for Defense Contractor Employees
Accompanying the Armed Forces, 33 PUB. CONT. L.J. 423, 427 (Winter 2004).
60
Id. at 429. For example, private security contractors Glen Doherty and Tyrone Woods,
both of whom were killed in the September 11, 2012, attack on the United States Consulate
in Benghazi, Libya, were part of Ambassador Chris Stevens’s personal security detail. Fran
Townsend, Former Navy SEALs Died After Coming to the Aid of Others, CNN (Sept. 23,
2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/09/21/world/africa/libya-consulate-attack/.
61
John Chamberlain, Insurance and Waivers Presentation at the Loyola Law School &
U.S. Department of Labor OWCP DBA Conference (Oct. 2008), available at http://www
.dol.gov/owcp/dlhwc/DBAInsuranceandWaivers.pdf.
62
Id. at 4.
63
LHWCA, 33 U.S.C.A. § 902(2) (West 2013).
64
Martin v. Halliburton, 808 F. Supp. 2d 983, 989 (S.D. Tex. 2011); see also Pac. Emp’rs
Ins. Co. v. Pillsbury, 61 F.2d 101, 103 (9th Cir. 1932).
65
LHWCA § 902(2).
57
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DBA benefits include reimbursement for medical expenses, compensation
for disability of any extent or duration, death benefits to a deceased contractor’s surviving dependents, and vocational rehabilitation for those who are
permanently disabled.66 Insurers and self-insuring employers have fourteen
days from notification of an injury to begin paying benefits.67 After paying
out benefits, the insurer may apply to DoL for indemnification under the
WHCA if the injury was the result of a qualifying war hazard.68
DBA compensation is an injured contractor’s exclusive remedy against
his employer.69 The Act incorporates the LHWCA’s exclusion of all tort
actions against the employer unless the employer has failed to comply with
its obligations under the Act.70 Because exclusivity is central to the Act’s purposes, courts are generally reluctant to set it aside, even in the face of apparently inequitable behavior by an employer.71
Criticisms of the DBA/WHCA regime generally fall into three lines of
argument.72 The first critique contends that the insurance-based scheme is
flawed because rapidly rising premiums have made it too expensive and
private insurers too often deny or delay coverage to injured contractors.73
The second critique argues that even if it were functioning properly, the
DBA workers’ compensation schedule provides inherently insufficient compensation to injured contractors.74 Finally, the third critique avers that the
DBA and WHCA create a circular mechanism that essentially has the government paying premiums on insurance policies and then, when claims are
66

Benefits Under the Defense Base Act, DLHWC (Oct. 2008), http://www.dol.gov
/owcp/dlhwc/BenefitsundertheDBA.pdf (last visited Nov. 19, 2014).
67
McClean, supra note 52, at 652.
68
Robb, supra note 59, at 431.
69
Fisher v. Halliburton, 667 F.3d 602, 610 (5th Cir. 2012).
70
LHWCA § 905(a).
71
See, e.g., Munns v. Clinton, 863 F. Supp. 2d 1001, 1020 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (holding that
employer’s and insurer’s alleged failure to pay benefits due was immaterial: the DBA barred
the plaintiffs’ wrongful death suit because they failed to exhaust administrative processes).
72
See, e.g., McLean, supra note 52; Jimmie I. Wise, MBA Professional Report, Outsourcing Wars: Comparing Risk, Benefits and Motivation of Contractors and Military Personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan (2009–2011), NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL, distributed
by Defense Technical Information Center, http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&meta
dataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA563459; Greta S. Milligan, Note, The Defense Base Act:
An Outdated Law and Its Current Implications, 86 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 407 (2009).
73
McClean, supra note 52, at 649. See also House Oversight Committee Inquires Into
DOD DBA Insurance, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR, ¶ 41 at 10 (May 2008)
(“In 2003, contractors operating in Iraq complained to DoD about sharp increases in DBA
insurance premiums and the inability to secure insurance at all.”).
74
E.g., Wise, supra note 72.
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made against these policies, also funding the pay-outs.75 Part II addresses
the first two critiques, that insurance is an ineffective mechanism for managing combat risk and that the DBA does not sufficiently compensate
injured contractors.
II. THE DBA INSURANCE MARKET IS FUNCTIONING AND PROVIDES
SUFFICIENT COMPENSATION TO INJURED CONTRACTORS
The first two critiques of the DBA are related in that they each argue that
the Act is conceptually flawed.76 The uninsurability critique points to high
premiums and low payout rates for DBA insurance as evidence that the government should not rely on private insurance markets to compensate injured
contractors.77 While DBA insurance premiums did rapidly increase in the early
2000s, and at the same time DBA insurance policies often included exclusions
that prevented military provider contractors from receiving compensation, the
most recent data show improvement.78 Insurance companies have stayed in
the DBA insurance market and premiums are falling.79
The insufficiency critique, on the other hand, argues that, even if functioning properly, the DBA/LHWCA compensation schedule is insufficient to
make injured contractors whole, especially when compared with the much
more generous benefits available to regular military service members through
the Veterans Administration (VA).80 The response is a fairly simple analysis
of the transactional decision-making underlying the critique’s comparison
of VA benefits to DBA benefits.81 Military service members and private
security contractors are volunteers who presumably take their benefits into
account when choosing to enter the service or sign on to a contract.82
A. The Uninsurability Critique
The uninsurability critique is based on the idea that the risk of injury or
death in a combat zone is too high for an insurance model to work, as evidenced by the sharp rise in DBA insurance premiums after the start of the
75

Milligan, supra note 72, at 427.
McClean, supra note 52, at 648–49 (exemplifying the uninsurability critique); see
generally Wise, supra note 72, at 41–44 (exemplifying the insufficiency critique).
77
E.g., Milligan, supra note 72, at 423 (“[T]he unpredictability of risks and liabilities in the
DBA insurance market may impede the ability of insurers to calculate accurate premiums ....”).
78
See infra note 102 and accompanying text.
79
Id.
80
See infra Part II.B (examining the insufficiency critique).
81
Id.
82
Id.
76
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insurgency in Iraq.83 “[B]etween 2002 and 2008, the DBA insurance market
grew from about $18 million to more than $400 million in government
premiums.”84 Insurance premiums are especially high for combat-zone DoD
contracts, which carry the greatest risk of injury or death.85
High insurance premiums also reflect non-risk attributes of the combat
environment.86 Distant unstable theaters of conflict present significant logistical challenges for rendering care to injured contractors and for paying out
benefits,87 especially when proving claims that “[involve] parties or witnesses
who speak different languages, have different cultural norms, and are thousands of miles apart.”88 Uncertainty is also a major non-risk driver of high
DBA insurance rates.89
The environment in countries like Iraq and Afghanistan and the work that
PMCs do are resistant to actuarial analysis, which depends on a sufficient
body of reliable data for its predictions.90 Particularly at the start of the Iraq
and Afghanistan wars, insurance providers had little data on which to base
their risk assessments and had little understanding of the circumstances under
which they would have to pay DBA claims.91 Because many DBA insurance
policies exclude coverage when the insured is injured in combat, from a terrorist attack, while carrying a weapon, or while riding in military transport,
there is often serious uncertainty over whether injured contractors will be
compensated by their insurer under the DBA or directly by the government
under the WHCA.92
Despite these obstacles, insurance companies have stayed in the DBA
insurance market.93 While the top four carriers do have a substantial share of
the total number of policies, there are eighty-eight different carriers operating
in the marketplace.94 Some PMCs have opted for self-insurance, but this is
83

See McClean, supra note 52, at 649; House Oversight Committee Inquires Into DOD
DBA Insurance, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR, ¶ 41 at 10 (May 2008).
84
McClean, supra note 52, at 649.
85
See Goins, Fowler, & Annus, supra note 17, at 17; McClean, supra note 52, at 649.
86
McClean, supra note 52, at 650.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Id. at 652.
90
Id. at 650–51.
91
See Milligan, supra note 72, at 425–26.
92
Goins, Fowler, & Annus, supra note 17, at 17.
93
See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, OFF. OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION PROGRAM, DIVISION
OF LONGSHORE AND HARBOR WORKERS, COMPENSATION, DEFENSE BASE ACT CASE SUMMARY BY CARRIER (2014), available at http://www.dol.gov/owcp/dlhwc/dbaallcarrier.htm
(last visited Nov. 19, 2014) (showing the insurance companies in the DBA insurance
market through June 30, 2014).
94
Id.
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more likely due to their own lower than average risk exposure than to the
absolute price of DBA insurance premiums.95 Furthermore, the most recent
data indicate that many of the non-risk factors contributing to high DBA
premiums have been mitigated through reforms and experience.96
First, DoL’s Division of Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation
(DLHWC), which administers DBA compensation claims, reformed the process by which it processes claims to handle the greater than expected volume,
thereby reducing delays in payouts and thus insurers’ uncertainty over their
eligibility for WHCA reimbursement.97 Second, now that the DBA/WHCA
mechanism has been in heavy use for well over a decade, DBA insurance
premiums, which were never the most important contributor to PMC contract
costs, are on their way down.98
For DoS contracts early in the Iraq war, DBA insurance premiums ranged
from 2 to 5 percent of total contract costs.99 This figure was substantially
higher for DoD contracts, but still only accounted for between 10 and 21 percent of PMC contract costs of performance at its highest.100 However,
these data are from the 2005 GAO report that touched off the Congressional
controversy over the differential between DoS and DoD DBA insurance
premiums, and represent the peak of the DBA insurance premium spike
coming after the start of the Iraq insurgency.101 In each succeeding year,
DBA premiums have declined and should continue to do so.102
B. The Insufficiency Critique
The Act’s critics further contend, however, that even if the insurance
mechanism is operating effectively, workers’ compensation is inherently insufficient compensation for the injury or death of a contractor when viewed
in relation to the substantial benefits afforded to military service members
and their families injured or killed in similar circumstances.103 There is no
95

Valerie Bailey Grasso, Baird Webel, & Scott Szymendera, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
RL34670, THE DEFENSE BASE ACT (DBA): THE FEDERALLY MANDATED WORKERS’ COMPENSATION SYSTEM FOR OVERSEAS GOVERNMENT CONTRACTORS 7–9 (2010), available at
http://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL34670.pdf.
96
See generally Grasso, Webel, & Szymendera, supra note 95.
97
McClean, supra note 52, at 652; OFFICE OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION PROGRAMS,
ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FY 2009 (2011), at 33, 36, available at http://www.dol.gov
/owcp/09owcpmx.pdf.
98
Milligan, supra note 72, at 426; Grasso, Webel, & Szymendera, supra note 95, at 19.
99
Milligan, supra note 72, at 424–25.
100
Id.
101
Grasso, Webel, & Szymendera, supra note 95, at 19.
102
Id. For example, in 2005, premiums were down 14.8 percent, and by 2006, they had
dropped nearly 50 percent from their 2004 peak. Id.
103
See, e.g., Joshua Schmand, Helping More Patriots for Less Money: Amending The
Defense Base Act to Insure Defense Contractors in War Zones Under The Servicemembers’
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substantial evidence to support this proposition. One author, for example,
citing three anecdotal cases among the more than 100,000 reported DBA
claims since 2001, contends that the three contractors’ stories are sufficient
evidence to conclude that the DBA cannot adequately compensate injured
PMC contractors.104
But even assuming, arguendo, that three data points among so many are
significant, the three cases Kestian cites are examples of a functioning, if
overburdened, system. While the injured contractor in each cited case had to
pursue reimbursement, he received full reimbursement of medical expenses,
back disability pay with interest, and a further ten percent award to compensate him for the delay.105 In each case, the injured contractor was made whole
through the faster, more efficient process of an administrative hearing and did
not have to endure the likely much greater delays and expense of protracted
litigation to receive due compensation.106
Other authors are highly skeptical of the ability of workers’ compensation to play any part in a viable scheme.107 For example, Shailendra Kulkarni
compares the LHWCA’s no-fault system for compensating injured nonseaman maritime workers to the tort system under which seamen fall.108
Group Life Insurance Plan, 42 PUB. CONT. L.J. 827, 835–38 (2013); see also Shailendra U.
Kulkarni, Comment, The Seaman Status Situation: Historical Perspectives and Modern Movements in the U.S. Remedial Regime, 31 TUL. MAR. L.J. 121, 124 (2006) (arguing that the
LHWCA is insufficient to compensate injured workers because their potential recoveries are
not unlimited).
104
Matthew R. Kestian, Comment, Civilian Contractors: Forgotten Veterans of the War on
Terror, 39 U. TOL. L. REV. 887, 900–05 (2008). Kestian’s example cases are those of Samuel
Walker, William Manning, and “V.G.” Id. Walker was an on-base contractor employed to
run recreation facilities for soldiers in Iraq when he was wounded by a suicide bomber. Id.
at 901. His injuries were serious, but not life-threatening, and the crux of his case became his
difficulty obtaining coverage for post-traumatic stress disorder treatment. Id. at 902. He had to
complain to DoL, but was eventually compensated in full starting nineteen months after his
injury and his employer had to pay a 10 percent penalty for not compensating him promptly.
Id. Manning was employed in Iraq as a foreman for Iraqi laborers and was wounded by a
mortar attack. Id. at 903. Like Walker’s employer, Manning’s did not provide him with prompt
compensation for his injuries or reimbursement for his medical expenses. Id. Like Walker, a
DoL administrative law judge (ALJ) eventually ordered that Manning be fully compensated
and reimbursed and imposed a ten percent penalty on his employer. Id. at 904. Finally, V.G.
was a contract laborer in Afghanistan who was injured when a rocket propelled grenade struck
the tent in which he was sleeping. Id. at 904. Like the others, he received treatment and was
evacuated to the United States, but his employer refused to pay for some care and delayed
payment of his disability compensation. Id. at 905. As in the other cases, an ALJ eventually
awarded him full compensation and imposed a penalty on his employer for its delay. Id.
105
Id. at 902, 904–05.
106
Id.
107
E.g., Kulkarni, supra note 103, at 124–25.
108
Id.
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She argues that the LHWCA is insufficient because it (1) limits a worker’s
compensation to 200 percent of the average national wage; (2) forces workers to bring their claims through DoL’s administrative adjudication process; and (3) prevents workers from bringing negligence suits against their
employers.109 However applicable these arguments may be to maritime
workers,110 none of Kulkarni’s complaints about the LHWCA hold water
in the context of private security contractors.
First, critics like Kulkarni and Kestian tend to ignore the total compensation
arrangement that private security contractors enjoy.111 While they may not
have as robust an injury compensation system as regular military service members have,112 their salaries are much higher.113 In that light, the insufficiency
critique is inconsistent with the larger PMC criticism that argues that PMC
use is a threat to the all-volunteer military system because PMCs offer more
attractive overall compensation packages.114 Critics like Kestian and McClean
instead focus narrowly on the number of DBA claims that are denied—thirty
percent to fifty percent.115 Complaints like Kulkarni’s about the cap on compensation have a similarly narrow focus.116 This glass-half-empty analysis
ignores the fact that most claims under the DBA are promptly paid in full.117
These arguments also ignore or discount the fundamental quid pro quo
that is the basis for this type of no-fault regime: “‘Employers relinquish[]
their defenses to tort actions in exchange for limited and predictable liability,’
and ‘[e]mployees accept the limited recovery because they receive prompt
109

Id.
See discussion infra Part III.C (regarding the zone of uncertainty between the LHWCA
and maritime tort law).
111
See infra note 113 and accompanying text.
112
The DBA does provide substantial benefits that are not an insignificant part of this
total package. See infra Part III.A.
113
See Schmitt, supra note 3, at 515 (arguing that high-paying PMC jobs are causing
a “brain drain” in western military special forces units); DUNIGAN, supra note 14, at 65
(noting that high contractor salaries may have a deleterious effect on regular military
morale, recruitment, and retention).
114
Id.
115
See Kestian, supra note 104, at 902; McClean, supra note 52, at 659 (“[I]nsurance
carriers also paid claims in only about half the cases.”).
116
See Kulkarni, supra 103, at 124.
117
See infra Part III.B. (explaining that claim payment rates have been rapidly increasing). Furthermore, backlogs in DBA compensation claims are not dissimilar from the
substantial backlogs in VA disability claims. Both injured contractors and disabled veterans
have had to wait in long lines due to the very large number of casualties suffered in the
Iraq and Afghanistan Wars. See, e.g., Josh Hicks, House Panel to Examine VA’s Progress
With Backlog of Disability Claims, THE WASH. POST FED. EYE BLOG (July 14, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/federal-eye/wp/2014/07/14/house-panel-to-examine
-vas-progress-with-backlog-of-disability-claims/.
110
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relief without the expense, uncertainty, and delay that tort actions entail.’”118
Kulkarni’s argument that a “lay jury” is superior to an ALJ misses the point
of the no-fault bargain.119 By trading away workers’ right to sue in tort for
negligence, Congress made a policy judgment to pursue the greater economic
benefit of a more efficient system for society as a whole, rather than to subordinate the interests of all taxpayers to the narrow personal interests of a few
individuals.120 Furthermore, a switch to a fault-based system would likely
have the opposite effect of what commentators like Kulkarni hope. While
some injured contractors could get more from a jury than they receive under
the DBA, contractors like the three Kestian cites would likely have to wait
even longer and, for the reasons detailed in Part III, run a substantial risk of
receiving no compensation at all if left to fend for themselves in the courts.121
III. THE DBA IS THE MOST EFFICIENT ALTERNATIVE FOR
FULFILLING ITS POLICY OBJECTIVES
The inefficiency critique attacks the Act on practical grounds: it alleges
that, because DoL is so actively involved in administering claims under the
DBA/LHWCA insurance scheme, any costs saved by outsourcing to private
insurers are undercut by duplicated efforts.122 However, this critique of the
DBA/WHCA regime ignores the cost savings to the industry, because by not
forcing PMCs to litigate every injury or death to one of their employees, the
DBA prevents the substantial financial and operational costs of such litigation
from being passed through to the government.123 Indeed, in a fault-based
compensation system, one wonders whether the United States would be able
to employ PMCs at all.
This may in fact be one reason why so many commentators favor a
tort-based system and is a major way in which the two main types of PMC
criticisms are related.124 Some of those who see PMCs as insufficiently
118

Fisher v. Halliburton, 667 F.3d 602, 610 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Morrison-Knudsen
Constr. Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 103 S.Ct. 2045, 2052 (1983)) (alterations in original).
119
See Kulkarni, supra note 103, at 124.
120
See, e.g., Fisher, 667 F.3d 602, 610.
121
See Davila-Perez v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 202 F.3d 464, 468 (1st Cir. 2000) (“The
purpose of the Defense Base Act is to provide uniformity and certainty in availability of compensation for injured employees on military bases outside the United States.”) (emphasis added).
122
Milligan, supra note 72, at 427.
123
See infra Part III.A (discussing costs of litigating tort liability for security contractors’
injuries incurred overseas).
124
The two main criticisms are (1) that PMCs are insufficiently accountable for their
actions and (2) that the contractors they employ are insufficiently compensated for their injuries. See DUNIGAN, supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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accountable for their actions see a fault-based tort regime as one way of
holding PMCs more accountable.125 There appears to be an overall dissatisfaction with PMCs underlying this argument, but as discussed below,
PMCs’ practical strategic benefits outweigh any additional costs associated
with their use.126 Thus, the inefficiency critique requires a response in two
parts: one to address whether PMCs are an inherently inefficient alternative to
regular military forces and examine the DBA’s contribution to that relative
efficiency, and another to examine whether the no-fault system is the most
efficient available mechanism for compensating injured private security
contractors.
A. DBA Insurance Premiums Do Not Make PMCs Too Expensive
In some respects, the inefficiency critique is a sub-part of an overall
cost-effectiveness argument against the use of PMCs.127 That argument
compares the marginal short-term cost of an individual private security contractor with that of a regular military service member, concluding that PMCs
are not a cost-effective alternative to the regular military because the contractors are paid a much higher salary and require the payment of costly DBA
insurance premiums and WHCA indemnities.128 But even if this were true,
it has little to do with the DBA and its associated costs because they are not
the main driver of PMC contract costs.129 Thus, to the extent that private security contractors may be marginally more expensive than regular soldiers,
the DBA’s contribution to that expense is small and shrinking.130
125

E.g., Margaret Z. Johns, Should Blackwater and Halliburton Pay for the People They’ve
Killed? Or Are Government Contractors Entitled to a Common-Law, Combatant-Activities
Defense?, 80 TENN. L. REV. 347, 349 (2013) (“Victims of contractor misconduct have turned
to tort law as a vehicle for receiving compensation and demanding accountability.”).
126
Infra Part III.A (weighing the financial costs and benefits of utilizing PMCs).
127
Tiefer, supra note 31, at 21–35. Tiefer argues that the entire LOGCAP logistics contract
for Iraq could have been replaced with 41,000 additional support troops deployed there
“without added wartime costs.” Id. at 28. Tiefer argues that military provider PMCs, even
when hired to provide security for other PMCs in a combat zone, are inherently too expensive and less effective than regular military forces. Id. at 30–31. Tiefer’s argument, however,
is in the context of an overall criticism of unilateralism in favor of multilateralism. Id. at
31. Thus, this comparison assumes, a priori, military action in the presence of large military
coalitions that ensure regular military forces are in fact available. Of course, it was the contracting chaos of a military action of this sort, the 1991 Gulf War, that led DoD to seek more
efficient means of delivering logistic support via the LOGCAP contracts.
128
Id.
129
See supra Part II.A. While a fuller discussion of the cost-effectiveness and strategic
value of PMCs is warranted, it is beyond the scope of this Note.
130
See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
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Additionally, even if DBA premiums remain high enough to keep marginal PMC contract costs higher than the marginal cost of using a regular soldier in the short term, PMCs are still significantly cheaper in the long term:
“[a]lthough salaries may exceed those of uniformed personnel, overhead
pales by comparison.”131 Critiques like those leveled by Tiefer typically rely
on short-term analyses of the form: in this mission, at this time, troops would
be cheaper than PMC contractors.132 This analysis assumes away the massive
overhead costs associated with military service members.133 Military service
members are long-term employees for whom the government must pay
food, lodging, training, medical care, and other costs regardless of whether
the service members are actively employed.134
PMC contractors, on the other hand, “perform discrete tasks” allowing
the government to tailor personnel to needs and completely avoid the massive
downtime and development costs associated with military service members.135
The marginal cost argument also ignores the fact that in a wide range of
specialty areas, private contractors often do a significantly better job than
the regular military—especially those requiring “knowledge of the terrain,
culture, and language of the region.”136 Finally, Tiefer’s analysis ignores the
common situation in which PMC contractors are the only personnel capable
of deploying, operating, or maintaining certain high technology systems.137
PMCs’ ability to tailor personnel to specific tasks also improves their
responsiveness to security demands:
Since contractors can be hired faster than DoD can develop an internal
capability, contractors can be quickly deployed to provide critical support
capabilities when necessary. Contractors also provide expertise in specialized fields that DoD may not possess, such as linguistics.... Contractors
can be hired when a particular need arises and be let go when their services are no longer needed.138

131

Schmitt, supra note 3, at 517–18.
See supra note 130.
133
See generally id.
134
DEP’T OF DEF., MILITARY COMPENSATION: BASIC PAY AND ALLOWANCES CHARTS
(2014), available at http://militarypay.defense.gov/PAY/.
135
Schmitt, supra note 3, at 518.
136
Moshe Schwartz, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40764, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
CONTRACTORS IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN: BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS 5–6 (2011),
available at http://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R40764.pdf.
137
See Brief for National Defense Industrial Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting Defendants-Appellants, Fisher v. Halliburton, 667 F.3d 602 (5th Cir. 2012) (Nos. 1020202, 20371), 2010 WL 4619490 at *3 [hereinafter NDIA Amicus Brief] (citing Schwartz,
supra note 136 at 2); Avant, supra note 23, at 21.
138
NDIA Amicus Brief (quoting Schwartz, supra note 136, at 2).
132
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In other words, even if the DBA/WHCA system makes it less cost-effective
to use PMCs than to use regular military forces, PMCs possess unique
attributes that make their services worth the extra cost.139 Accordingly, if
PMCs are going to be used even if more expensive than the military, they
will keep getting injured, so we must determine what system is best suited
to compensate them.
B. The No-Fault System Is More Efficient than Litigation140
In many ways, PMC contractors injured overseas provide the ideal case
for a no-fault injury compensation system. The DBA preempts state law tort
claims,141 and for good reason: fact-intensive inquiries into whether an
individual incident was accidental or not would fly in the face of the purposes
of the Act and, in light of the distances and dangers involved, is supremely
impractical.142 Without the Act’s exclusivity, courts would have to review in
minute detail the interactions of parties and witnesses that took place in a
combat zone thousands of miles away.143 If the DBA were replaced or opened
up to penetration by personal injury and wrongful death suits in tort, the perverse effect for plaintiffs would actually most likely be less compensation,
not more.
The original impetus for the DBA bears repeating: the Secretary of War
asked Congress to create a no-fault system of compensating injured contractors in order to save the government money.144 In Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., the Court invoked this same logic in its justification for the
government contractor defense: “[t]he financial burden of judgments against
139

See DUNIGAN, supra note 14, at 90. Dunigan argues that in smaller, more complex
security and stability missions like the one MPRI undertook in Croatia, highly professional
PMCs are more effective than the military because of their “skill, responsiveness, and
quality.” Id.
140
Some authors have also suggested a third alternative: bringing private security
contractors into the military’s benefit system, allowing them to avail themselves of DoD
health insurance, VA disability compensation, and Service Members’ Group Life Insurance
(SGLI). Schmand, supra note 103, at 840. That alternative may be worth further exploration, but state law tort suits are the chief alternative to DBA compensation actually advocated and employed by injured contractors. Huskey & Sullivan, supra note 13, at 368; see
also Kulkarni, supra note 103, at 125. Therefore, the VA/SGLI alternative will not be dealt
with further in this Note.
141
Flying Tiger Lines, Inc. v. Landy, 370 F.2d 46, 52 (9th Cir. 1966) (holding that the DBA
provides a covered contractor’s sole remedy against his employer); see also Fisher, 667
F.3d at 620–21 (holding that all of plaintiff’s state law tort claims against defendant PMC
were barred by the DBA).
142
See DBA, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1651–54 (West 2013).
143
See, e.g., Fisher, 667 F.3d at 602 (discussing the DBA’s exclusivity rule).
144
See supra Parts I & II.
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[PMCs] would ultimately be passed through, substantially if not totally, to the
United States itself, since [they] will predictably raise their prices to cover, or
to insure against, contingent liability for the Government-ordered [actions].”145
Contrary to the DBA’s critics’ assertions, a switch to tort-based liability
would actually make using PMCs more expensive, not less.146 It could even
undermine their use altogether: “the government will eventually end up paying for increased liability through higher contracting prices (or through an
inability to find contractors willing to take on certain tasks).”147 There is probably too much money at stake to expect that contractors would not bid to fill
the government’s security needs in a high-litigation environment, but high
competency and ethics standards would probably be the first casualty to the
cost-cutting efforts such an environment would inspire, perpetuating the very
problems that the DBA’s critics decry.148 Tort liability, for example, would
advantage under-capitalized (i.e. judgment-proof) companies that employ the
cheapest contractors, regardless of their competence.149
Even if the DBA persists, but is only softened by allowing injured contractors more and wider avenues for state tort suits, the Act would be less
efficient at meeting its twin goals of limiting employer liability and compensating injured workers promptly and fairly for two reasons.150 First, the
above-referenced barriers to fact-finding in all of these cases would seriously
hamper plaintiffs’ ability to meet their burden of proving PMCs’ liability.151
The very same sources of uncertainty that critics cite for not being able to insure private security presents serious obstacles to fact-finding.152 Witnesses
are less likely to be available or willing to testify than in domestic civil suits,
the events surrounding the harm complained of occur thousands of miles from
the forum, and both are shrouded by uncertainty born of the fog of war.153
These obstacles can only hurt the interests of plaintiffs.
145

Boyle v. United Tech. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 511–12 (1988).
Id. at 512.
147
Id.
148
Id.
149
See Chad C. Carter, Halliburton Hears A Who? Political Question Doctrine
Developments in the Global War on Terror and Their Impact on Government Contingency
Contracting, 201 MIL. L. REV. 86, 128 (2009) (arguing that costs will increase some as
litigation increases, but that the contractors themselves will bear much of the risk).
150
See Flying Tiger Lines, Inc. v. Landy, 370 F.2d 46, 52 (1996); Boyle v. United States
Tech. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 511–12 (1988).
151
Flying Tiger Lines, 370 F.2d at 52.
152
Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511–12.
153
Michael H. LeRoy, The New Wages of War—Devaluing Death and Injury:
Conceptualizing Duty and Employment in Combat Zones, 22 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 217,
225–26 (2011).
146
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A landmark Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) case, Feres v. United
States,154 expresses this problem well.155 There, the Supreme Court reviewed
appeals by three plaintiffs alleging injuries or deaths caused by the negligence
of the United States while the victim was in active duty military service.156
Ordinarily, these types of claims would be barred under the doctrine of sovereign immunity,157 but the plaintiffs contended that the government consented to be sued through the FTCA.158 While the Court agreed that the
FTCA granted jurisdiction, it concluded that the statute did not create any
new causes of action, but merely constituted the government’s consent to be
sued under those already existing.159 Because there was no cause of action
already existing that would allow a soldier to recover from the government
for his superiors’ negligence, the Court determined that the plaintiffs were
not entitled to relief.160
The most notable part of the decision in the context of the DBA, however,
is the Court’s policy justification for its holding.161 The Court determined that
barring service member tort suits against the government for injuries incident
to their service was justified by the existence of “enactments by Congress
which provide systems of simple, certain, and uniform compensation for injuries or death of those in armed services.”162 A no-fault compensation system was especially important in the case of military injuries overseas because
“[a] soldier is at peculiar disadvantage in litigation. Lack of time and money,
the difficulty if not impossibility of procuring witnesses, are only a few of
the factors working to his disadvantage.”163 The Feres court might just as
well have been referring to the wisdom of the DBA’s no-fault compensation
system in light of the challenges that private security contractors face in
pursuing litigation.
Second, and more importantly, there are powerful legal impediments to
a traditional tort law compensation system for PMCs.164 Even absent the
154

See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
See id. at 145.
156
See id. at 136–38.
157
See United States v. McLemore, 45 U.S. 286, 288 (1846) (explaining that “the
government is not liable to be sued, except with its own consent, given by law”).
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Feres, 340 U.S. at 138; see Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1346(b)(1)
(West 2013) (granting original jurisdiction to federal district courts for claims for money
damages against the United States).
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Feres, 340 U.S. at 141–42.
160
Id. at 144.
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Id.
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Id. (emphasis added) (the Court cites to a number of statutes that are no longer in
force, but which have been replaced by the Modern Veterans’ Disability System, Service
Members’ Group Life Insurance, and survivors’ death benefits). Id. at n.12.
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Id. at 145.
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See, e.g., 3 VED P. NANDA & DAVID K. PANSIUS, LITIGATION OF INTERNATIONAL
DISPUTES IN U.S. COURTS §14A:6 (2d ed. 2014).
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Act’s exclusivity, PMCs have a variety of defenses available to them to escape
liability for their tortious actions.165 Depending on the circumstances, suits
may be entirely barred by the FTCA, its attendant government contractor defense, or the constitutional Political Question Doctrine.166 In addition, because elite military provider firms work in an almost exclusively classified
environment,167 if PMCs were opened up to a large number of state tort lawsuits the government would be likely to intervene and assert its state secrets
privilege to prevent the disclosure of classified information through the civil
discovery process.
Though the Boyle court eventually refused to extend the Feres doctrine
explicitly to government contractors (including PMCs), it did so in part
because the Feres doctrine would not have provided enough protection for
contractors.168 Instead, the Boyle court recognized a government contractor
defense that brings contractors within the scope of the discretionary function
exception to the FTCA’s waiver of sovereign immunity when they are acting pursuant to government direction.169 In 2009, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit expressly extended this defense to PMCs and held
that their case for immunity was actually stronger than was the defendant’s
in Boyle.170
In that case, Saleh v. Titan Corp., a group of Iraqi citizens who were subject
to torture in Abu Ghraib prison sued two PMCs on a variety of grounds, including several District of Columbia Tort Causes of Action.171 Because the
detentions under which the plaintiffs’ claims arose were “combatant activities,” the court allowed the defendant PMCs to claim immunity through the
FTCA’s combatant activities exception.172 That clause excepts “any claim
arising out of the combatant activities of the military or armed forces[,]” and
the court accordingly found “an immunity net over any claim that arises out
of combat activities.”173 Thus, “during wartime,” all claims by private security
165

Id.
See LeRoy, supra note 153, at 222–23.
167
Military provider firms’ work by definition involves military operational and
intelligence activities, nearly all of which are required to be classified. See generally Department of Defense Handbook for Writing Security Classification Guidance DoD
5200.1-H (1999) (directing in Chapter 5 that most details of military operations be classified at least at the “Confidential” level and in Chapter 6 that most information related to intelligence activities be classified either “Secret” or “Top Secret”), available at http://www
.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/520001h.pdf.
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Boyle v. United Tech. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 510–11 (1988).
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Id. at 511.
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Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (emphasis added).
171
Id. at 1.
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Id. at 6–7.
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contractors are preempted when their PMC employers are “integrated into
combatant activities over which the military retain[s] command authority.”174
Courts have also extended Boyle’s government contractor defense itself
to PMCs where they were clearly under government direction and control.175
In addition, PMCs operating under government supervision are also likely
to be able to avoid liability under the political question doctrine.176 That doctrine bars suits as non-justiciable where the subject matter poses a significant threat to the separation of powers.177 In the PMC context, this means
that courts will dismiss suits that involve “judicial examination of military
policy or military decision making.”178
Finally, where the federal government becomes concerned that discovery
in a state tort suit may expose classified information, it sometimes intervenes
in the suit and moves to either bar discovery or dismiss the suit altogether
under its state secrets privilege.179 This is especially likely in the case of
military provider PMCs, which frequently operate alongside the military
in highly-classified settings.180 Such circumstances are “so pervaded by
state secrets as to be incapable of judicial resolution once the [state secrets]
174

Id. at 1; see also Al Shimari v. CACI Int’l, Inc., 658 F.3d 413, 419 (4th Cir. 2011)
(citing Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2009) and holding that the combatant
activities exception preempted suits by Iraqi nationals allegedly abused by private
security contractors in Abu Ghraib), rev’d and remanded on reh’g en banc on procedural
grounds, 679 F.3d 205 (4th Cir. 2012); Koohi v. United States, 976 F.2d 1328, 1336 (9th
Cir. 1992) (holding that the combatant activities exception applies to defense contractors);
S. Yasir Latifi, Comment, Bathrooms, Burn Pits, and Battlefield Torts: The Need for A
Particularized, Contextual Approach to the Combatant Activities Exception After Saleh
and Al Shimari, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1357, 1358–59 (2013).
175
See Carter, supra note 149, at 121.
176
Huskey & Sullivan, supra note 13, at 368–70; see also Fisher v. Halliburton, 667
F.3d 602, 621 (5th Cir. 2012) (suggesting in dictum that, even if plaintiffs’ claims were
not barred by the DBA, they might be non-justiciable under the political question doctrine).
177
Huskey & Sullivan, supra note 13, at 369; see also Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580 F.3d
1, 11–12 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (holding that state interests in enforcing their tort laws in overseas
combat zones are de minimis).
178
Huskey & Sullivan, supra note 13, at 370. PMCs have had more success asserting the
Political Question defense than the government contractor or combatant activities defenses.
However, because the D.C. Circuit in Saleh and the Fourth Circuit in Al Shimari make the
combatant activities defense “immunity net” so expansive, it is likely to be much more
useful to PMCs in the future and, accordingly, that defense receives greater treatment here.
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See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 6 (1953) (recognizing the government’s
privilege to prevent disclosure of classified information); see also, e.g., Bentzlin v. Hughes
Aircraft Co., 833 F.Supp. 1486, 1494–97 (C.D. Cal. 1993) (dismissing suit by survivors
of U.S. Marines killed in the first Iraq War on the basis of the government’s assertion, after
intervention of the state secrets privilege, as well as on the grounds of the government
contractor and combatant activities defenses).
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See supra note 167.
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privilege has been invoked.”181 Critically, some courts have proactively
asserted the State Secrets Privilege on behalf of the government, obviating the
need for its intervention.182 Thus, even if they were not barred by the DBA,
contractors hoping to sue their PMC employers in tort would be very unlikely
to recover in most cases.
These obstacles to tort suits are even more imposing when compared to
the improving certainty of an injured contractor’s recovery under the DBA.183
Kestian cites three examples of delayed recovery for contractors under the
DBA, but the fact that each did have to endure delays before receiving full
compensation is more reasonably attributable to the excessive volume of
claims than to an inherent flaw in the system.184 To the extent that there is a
structural problem with prompt payment, it is rapidly being remedied.185
In 2009, before DLHWC implemented aggressive reforms in response
to Congressional pressure, only forty-three percent of DBA claims were paid
in the first thirty days after injury.186 But in each succeeding year, the prompt
payment rate has substantially improved so that by the end of fiscal year 2013,
two-thirds of all DBA claims received first payment within thirty days.187
A person who has been deprived of his livelihood or a family that has been
deprived of a loved one is better served by such certainty and promptitude—
no tort-based system can boast of approaching it and even a partial expansion of PMCs’ tort exposure would put it at risk.
C. The LHWCA’s Problematic Border Zones Demonstrate the Risks of
Allowing Tort Suits to Penetrate the DBA’s Exclusivity
Congress passed the LHWCA in 1927 in an effort to protect longshore
and harbor workers, who had previously been on the fringes of the maritime
tort system.188 In Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen,189 the Supreme Court held
181

El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 306 (4th Cir. 2007) (dismissing plaintiff’s
claims regarding his alleged rendition by the CIA against the United States and three PMC
defendants) (citing Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 106 (1875)).
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Ibrahim v. Titan Corp., 391 F. Supp. 2d 10, 19 (D.D.C. 2005) (granting defendant
PMC’s motion for summary judgment in part to avoid exposing state secrets through
discovery).
183
See Kestian, supra note 104, at 900–05.
184
Id. By way of analogy: A slow drain does not show that indoor plumbing is not
better than outdoor plumbing. It shows that there is too much material in the pipes.
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See, e.g., McClean, supra note 52, at 675–77 (discussing the ongoing debate and
resulting reform efforts in detail).
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UNITED STATES DEP’T LABOR, DIVISION OF LONGSHORE AND HARBOR WORKERS’
COMPENSATION, LONGSHORE PERFORMANCE PAGE (2011), http://www.dol.gov/owcp
/dlhwc/LongshoreProgramPerformanceResults.htm.
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Id.
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GRANT GILMORE & CHARLES L. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 408 (2d ed., 1975).
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244 U.S. 205 (1917).
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that state workers’ compensation laws could not apply to longshoremen
injured or killed while working on a vessel in navigable waters.190 Congress
reacted by explicitly creating the LHWCA’s Federal Workers’ Compensation
Scheme,191 moving longshore and harbor workers from the fault-based maritime tort system to a no-fault workers’ compensation system. Congress appears to have acknowledged and attempted to avoid the problems of a tort
system under conditions that make extensive fact-finding difficult, expensive, and uncertain.192
However, the LHWCA’s no-fault system is complicated by interactions
on its borders with state workers’ compensation laws and maritime tort
law.193 The state workers’ compensation “twilight zone” has its genesis in
the “maritime but local” exception to admiralty’s uniformity principle:
some incidents, though properly within admiralty otherwise, are of purely
local concern such that state law applies.194 In the context of the LHWCA,
maritime but local means that, under certain circumstances, workers who fall
within the “twilight zone” between the LHWCA and state workers’ compensation may choose whichever no-fault remedy they prefer.195
The LHWCA’s border with maritime torts, especially a seaman’s action
for his employer’s negligence under the Jones Act, is more problematic.196
Injured seamen have a general maritime law entitlement to “Maintenance &
Cure,” a minimal workers’ compensation-like system that requires their
vessel’s owner to provide them with medical care and bare-survival living
expenses while they are being treated.197 To gain any sort of compensation
for their injuries, however, seamen must resort to the courts and bring an
action for unseaworthiness of the vessel198 or their employers’ negligence
under the Jones Act.199 The “zone of uncertainty” between the mutually
exclusive maritime tort and LHWCA systems arises from the fact that many
workers perform tasks that “‘exhibit[] the characteristics of both traditional
land and sea duties ....’”200 The result is that, in almost total frustration of the
LHWCA’s intent to avoid the costs of litigation, many maritime workers file
tort suits simply alleging that they are, in the alternative, harbor workers or
190
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See id. at 418–19, 421–24.
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Jones Act seamen, and let the fact-finder determine in each case which
scheme applies.201
The DBA is presently untroubled by the LHWCA’s problematic border
zones. Congress drafted it to avoid recreating the LHWCA’s “twilight zone”
interaction with state workers’ compensation schemes,202 and the geographical reality that injured private security contractors’ claims under the DBA
arise overseas adds further insulation. More importantly, the LHWCA’s
“zone of uncertainty” over the status of maritime workers does not touch
the DBA, which has no alternative status comparable to the maritime worker’s
claim of seaman status.203 This is a good thing for DBA-covered contractors,
who would face greater barriers to fact-finding204 and steeper legal barriers
to tort suits205 than injured maritime workers. Thus, if the government keeps
using PMCs, and they keep getting injured, the DBA is the best available
alternative for compensating them for their injuries.
IV. UNPROFESSIONAL PMCS EXACERBATE THE DBA’S FLAWS
Despite its functionality, though, the DBA is far from perfect. Recent
years have shown that it is vulnerable to delays from an overly high volume of claims and to short-circuiting by the malfeasance of unscrupulous
employers.206 While both of these vulnerabilities doubtless have a number
of sources, there is evidence that the less professional and formally organized
a PMC is, the more it contributes to these problems.207 Shawn Engbrecht’s
thesis in America’s Covert Warriors is that because military provider PMCs
operate in a “regulatory vacuum,” the largest, most experienced, and most
formally organized PMCs fare best in terms of both safety for their contractors and their standards of conduct:
As a rule large companies that can eventually be held accountable to either
a board of directors or shareholders have managed to avoid most of the
201

Id. at 346–47.
Flying Tiger Lines, Inc. v. Landy, 370 F.2d 46, 52 (9th Cir. 1966) (rejecting the
“twilight zone” in the context of the DBA).
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See supra Part III.B.
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political question doctrine, combatant activities exception, or state secrets privilege in the
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McClean, supra note 52, at 654–55.
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These flaws are closely linked to one another: DoL reported that the volume of DBA
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time.” Grasso, Webel, & Szymendera, supra note 95, at 3.
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fallout from egregious contractor conduct. These boards and shareholders
have provided a modicum of deterrent ... [and] been able to partially
self-regulate ....
With the exception of Blackwater, the gravest issues lay with smaller,
amateur companies lacking experience, depth, and the prerequisite sets of
checks and balances. They also do not have boards, shareholders, or a high
concentration of career military.208

Engbrecht offers an anecdote that is illustrative of this point.209
Engbrecht’s company, the Center for Advanced Security Studies (CASS), is
a PMC that provides a personal security training course to contractors and
then links graduates up with military provider PMCs.210 During the Iraq War,
CASS received an inquiry from a man Engbrecht calls “Joel”: a twentythree-year-old Canadian who wanted to hire a large number of CASS
graduates.211 CASS had thirteen graduates available, but the company felt
that only five were ready for security work in a combat environment.212 After
further investigation, CASS discovered that Joel was only interested in the
eight contractors it did not endorse—its representative came to the conclusion that this was because “while these individuals were trained, Joel felt
he could control them and hide his lack of experience from them.”213 Joel,
who claimed to have served with the Canadian Special Forces, had no military experience.214 In fact, he formed his PMC by walking into the dining
tent of the Kuwait military base where he was employed as a tent-mender and
asking for volunteers.215
Despite his company’s utter lack of trained or experienced operators,
tent-mender Joel had no trouble finding financial backing or contracts escorting logistics convoys from Kuwait into Iraq.216 His company persisted in its
practice of hiring incompetent but inexpensive contractors despite warnings
that they were unqualified for combat.217 One such contractor, who Engbrecht
calls “Nader,” came out of CASS’s course with a “heavy endorsement that
208

ENGBRECHT, supra note 16, at 19–20. This is not to argue that established PMCs are
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[he] not be allowed to possess firearms.”218 After a brief firefight, which
Nader spent “cowering on the floor,” he got up and shot an innocent thirteenyear-old girl in the head.219 Nader and his team then drove off, leaving the
girl lying in the street.220 The representative from Joel’s company who
related the incident lamented: “I’m stuck with an inept killer on the payroll.
My fear is, how many others are out there that I don’t know about?”221
Engbrecht offers several other examples of the results of the rampant lack
of preparation and vetting of candidates by informally organized PMCs.222
One is the story of a contractor who arrived in Iraq with a special suitcase for
his Stetson cowboy hat, “no neutral-colored clothing in tans and browns ...
[and] a set of really expensive fishing tackle.”223 The contractor had
planned, at the height of the Iraq insurgency’s violence, to spend his evenings
fishing off bridges over the Euphrates River, which runs right through Baghdad’s most dangerous neighborhoods.224 “[H]e would have been killed in
minutes[.]”225 Another describes the arrival in Baghdad of a contractor
that the hiring PMC had worried might be “overly bloodthirsty”:
The individual in question, a young man in his early twenties, seemed very
agitated. It was just then that a massive car bomb detonated several miles
away.... The new kid was white as a sheet. He never said a word but just
turned around and got right back on the plane.226

Unfortunately, many contractors like the one noted above did not get back
on the plane, and the current market structure makes it difficult to exclude
these incompetent individuals or the fly-by-night PMCs, like tent-mender
Joel’s, that employ them.227 Demand for private security contractors in Iraq
and Afghanistan was so high that even when a PMC dismissed an inept
contractor, he “could always find work with a questionable firm whose operating standards matched [his.]”228 Engbrecht relates incident after incident
in which a contractor like the ones described here “vented his fear on the
innocent,”229 or got himself or others around him seriously hurt or killed.230
218
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Professionalism is the best protection against such incidents. The more
professional a PMC is, the better able it is to integrate with regular military
forces, and the more it tends to respect local customs and traditions.231 These
attributes confer multiple benefits: a good relationship with the military
allows a PMC to benefit from the military’s intelligence, security, and logistics
infrastructure. A good relationship with the local population allows a PMC
to gain information critical to avoiding dangerous situations and makes its
contractors significantly less likely to commit atrocities.232 But Engbrecht
argues that without the internal controls in the established PMCs that experienced senior executives and board members provide, market forces exert
too much pressure on less-established PMCs to cut corners, and they cannot
capture these benefits.233
Less-established PMCs are also at risk because of the difficulty of properly
assessing the risks and requirements of private security contracts in a complex operational environment. This is especially so in fixed-price contracting,
under which the contractor bears the risk, and is therefore entitled to the
potential benefits, of performance price volatility.234 The danger to lessestablished PMCs here is that they are more likely than experienced PMCs to
assess risks and costs poorly and accordingly underbid contracts. This leads
to much greater pressure to employ inexpensive, but inexperienced contractors
like Nader or to sub-contract work out to companies like tent-mender Joel’s.235
Another way less-established PMCs sometimes cut corners is to shortcircuit the DBA. In Munns v. Clinton, for example, beneficiaries of private
231

DUNIGAN, supra note 14, at 86–88. These companies require their contractors to wear
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See ENGBRECHT, supra note 16, at 29–31. Engbrecht relates the story of a private
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info on whether or not an attack was going to happen.” Id. at 30. He claims that, as a result,
his information about pending attacks was “usually more accurate and up to date than the
military’s.” Id. at 31.
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security contractors who were abducted and killed in Iraq brought suit for,
among other things, the failure of their decedents’ employer to pay any of
the DBA benefits it owed to the plaintiffs.236 The court dismissed their
claims because they had not exhausted their remedies through DoL administrative processes, and even if they had, it held that the PMC defendant
was covered by “numerous statutory exceptions to the FTCA.”237
In their exposition of the insurance premium critique of the DBA, Goins,
Fowler, and Annus make the point that the requirement to hold expensive
DBA insurance policies is at odds with the procurement policy preference for
small businesses, as these entities are least likely to be able to afford high
premiums.238 This argument, however, is better expressed as a critique of the
smaller, less-established PMCs themselves: small, closely held corporations
are generally more likely to be undercapitalized than are large, established
corporations that strictly observe corporate formalities.239
Indeed, Engbrecht assigns much of the blame for unprofessional PMCs’
behavior on their informal structures.240 For example, in discussing Blackwater’s troubles, he notes that “at the time, [Blackwater] was privately held.”241
The story of Blackwater’s evolution demonstrates the distinction between
formally organized, professional PMCs and informally organized, incompetent PMCs better than most.
Until 2010, Blackwater was a closely held corporation, entirely owned
and operated by its founder, Erik Prince.242 Prince sold all of his interest in
the company to USTC, a consortium of investors that came in with the express intent of shifting the embattled PMC toward “the highest standards of
236
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governance, transparency, and performance.”243 Under Prince, Blackwater’s
contractors engaged in violent behavior with management’s “implied endorsement,”244 and were involved in more shooting incidents in Iraq from
2005 to 2007 than larger PMCs DynCorp International and Triple Canopy
combined.245
Now, as Academi, the company boasts an experienced board of directors246
of the sort that Engbrecht credits with keeping companies like MPRI and
DynCorp International ethical.247 Whether this shift will eliminate the company’s past problems remains to be seen, but since its transition, Academi
has not been involved in any major scandals. Perhaps most importantly,
Academi is now a member in good standing of the International Stability
Operations Association (ISOA), an ethics-based PMC trade association.248
Established PMCs formed organizations like ISOA because they understood that a lack of legitimacy threatened their business model.249 In order
to address this legitimacy concern, ISOA limits its membership to PMCs
that have appropriate ethical standards.250 ISOA’s Standards Committee
investigates alleged misconduct by member companies, and if the violation
is serious enough, it can expel the company from the Association.251 When
Blackwater came under investigation for the Nisoor Square massacre in 2007,
it withdrew from ISOA, presumably in order to avoid an ISOA Standards
Committee investigation.252 The company did not rejoin ISOA until after
Prince’s departure.253
There is some empirical support for the relationship among ISOA
membership, professionalism, and PMC safety records. DLHWC provides a
243
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variety of statistics regarding DBA claims on its website.254 These include
a listing of the number of claims by employer, year, and general type of claim
for any year since 2001 or comprehensively over the whole twelve-year span
from September 2001 to September 2013.255
Ideally, one could simply compare the number of claims to the number of
contractors in theater to arrive at a ratio that would enable direct comparison
of each PMC’s safety record. Because their complex contractual relationships
and often classified employment make it difficult to determine the number of
contractors a PMC had in a combat zone at any given time, however, this
comparison is not readily available.256 But because combat is more likely
than ordinary workplace accidents to result in deaths, a PMC’s ratio of deaths
to total claims can provide a very rough surrogate for how dangerous it was
for a contractor to work for that company.257
For example, ISOA member DynCorp International, one of the military
provider PMCs that Engbrecht frequently holds up as an example of a highly
professional company, had death claims accounting for only 1.5 percent of
its total, less than half the average for all PMCs.258 On the other hand, none
of the thirty companies with the highest percentage of DBA death claims
is a member of either ISOA or BAPSC.259 Thus, if private security contracts
were only awarded to PMCs that are members of either BAPSC or ISOA,
the PMCs that appear to be the most dangerous would have been excluded
from the market, substantially reducing the volume of DBA claims.
254

Defense Base Act Case Summary Reports—DBA Cumulative Report by Employer
(9/1/2001-9/30/2013), DLHWC, http://www.dol.gov/owcp/dlhwc/lsdbareports.htm (last
visited Nov. 19, 2014) [hereinafter DLHWC DBA Reports].
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See, e.g., James Risen and Mark Mazzetti, 30 False Fronts Won Contracts for
Blackwater, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 3, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/04/world
/middleeast/04blackwater.html (noting that security classification and contract complexity
prevent certainty on the number and size of contracts awarded to Blackwater).
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See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, CENSUS OF FATAL OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES SUMMARY
(2013) (showing a total of 4,405 fatal work injuries in 2013).
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Id. The overall total for all employers during the period was 3,430 death claims and
102,190 total claims, yielding an overall death claim ratio of 3.3 percent, more than double
DynCorp’s figure. Id. DynCorp is not just a member of ISOA: William Imbrie, DynCorp’s
Senior Director for International Programs, is the Chair of ISOA’s board of directors. ISOA
Leadership, ISOA, http://www.stability-operations.org/?page=Leadership (last visited
Nov. 19, 2014).
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DLHWC DBA Reports, supra note 254. The average death claim rate for these
companies is 57.6 percent, or nearly forty times DynCorp’s. Id. It is worth reiterating that
this is a very rough calculation, and it is especially so for very small PMCs. For example, a
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those of companies in the top thirty is striking enough to have some value.
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V. EXISTING CREDENTIALING STANDARDS OFFER AN EFFICIENT PRO HOC
MECHANISM FOR ENSURING PMC COMPETENCE
The DBA regime still requires serious improvements, but an ongoing
dialog among the PMC industry, insurers, Congress, and the government
agencies that use PMCs is yielding results that are rapidly addressing all of
the critics’ procedural and structural complaints.260 Then again, existing
regulations only tiptoe to the edge of laying down competence standards for
PMCs without ever stepping across. For example, 32 C.F.R. Part 159 (Part
159) requires DoD and DoS to coordinate in developing and promulgating
minimum standards “for the regulation of the selection, accountability, training, equipping, and conduct” of PMCs in overseas contingency operations.261
The regulation does not, however, provide any specific guidance to commanders and diplomats on what these standards ought to be.262 Without an
a priori set of standardized requirements, the market cannot respond, and
demand for professional PMCs will continue to outstrip supply.
If DoD and DoS amend Part 159 to require PMCs to be certified,263
they would create pressure on existing firms to either professionalize or exit
the market.264 Using existing certification sources like ISOA would allow
the government to capture this benefit with minimal additional resources
or regulation.265
If Part 159 required third-party competence certification, the effect of
expulsion from an organization like ISOA would be a de facto debarment, but
without the need for a costly and time-consuming government investigation.266
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See, e.g., McClean, supra note 52, at 675–77 (discussing the ongoing debate and
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of 2008 § 862(a), Pub. L. No. 110-181, 122 Stat. 3. Another alternative would be legislative
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Huskey & Sullivan, supra note 13, at 347 (discussing the Arms Export Control Act of
1968, Pub. L. No. 90-269, 82 Stat. 1320 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2751 et. seq.) and ITAR
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an export license for “defense services”. Id. Adding certification to ITAR’s licensing requirements would accomplish the same goal as amending 32 C.F.R. Part 159 in the same way.
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When Blackwater withdrew from ISOA in 2007, it showed that ISOA’s investigations are effective enough to influence major PMC behavior.267 A mandatory certification provision in Part 159 would bolster such investigations,
and would have a strong standardizing effect on the industry.268 Member
PMCs would have to submit to certifier investigation or withdraw from the organization and, in so doing, lose their ability to win contracts with the United
States government.269
Private security contract prices would undoubtedly go up in the absolute
sense, as PMCs which do not meet certifier standards would be forced out of
the market, thereby reducing available supply. However, the large external
costs of employing such PMCs would also be avoided, not least of which
being a reduction in casualties and non-compliance with the DBA. These initial savings would likely not be enough to overcome the supply reduction, but
in the long run, the industry is likely to adapt.270 Because the current members of groups like ISOA and BAPSC joined in response to existing market
pressure for PMCs to be more responsible,271 it is not a far leap to conclude
that non-member PMCs could quickly bring themselves into compliance
with certification standards in the face of a demand that they do so from their
largest potential customer.272 Thus, after a transition period, the supply of
267
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Matt Heibel, Military Inc.: Regulating and Protecting the “A-Team(s)” of the PostModern Era, 18 PACE INT’L L. REV. 531, 545 (2006) (arguing that ISOA cannot effectively
regulate its members’ conduct because it lacks the power of a government mandate).
269
To avoid the problems associated with a sole-source certifier, DoD and DoS should
promulgate a simple standard of qualification for third-party certifier status and publish a list
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their conduct.”). To the extent that PMCs joined these organizations in an effort to avoid the
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of private security services. See, e.g., Appeals of F Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., Inc.,
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pressure approaching that which government regulation would achieve, and this could be
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competent and ethical military provider firms should actually increase, leaving the DBA under a decreased burden, and allowing the government to make
use of PMCs with a reduced fear for the safety of the individual contractors
or the civilians with whom they interact.
CONCLUSION
Since the Fallujah incident in 2004 and the Nisoor Square massacre in
2006, Congress, DoD, and DoS have made strides in improving PMC accountability and contract management. Nonetheless, there is still no competence-based requirement in PMC contracting that would prevent the worst
PMCs from performing armed security functions in a combat zone.273 Because demand for private security services continues to outstrip the supply of
competent providers, incompetent PMCs continue to win sensitive combatzone security contracts. Their inexperience, corner-cutting, and unethical behavior puts their inept contractors and the civilians with whom they interact
at risk. Their greater casualty rates and willingness to short-circuit the DBA
exacerbate inherent flaws in the mechanism.
Regardless of these problems, however, the mechanism itself is worth
keeping. After more than a decade of war in which PMCs have been extensively used, insurers have sufficient data to accurately set reasonable rates.
DoL has implemented procedures to ensure better compliance and payment
rates are improving.274 Notwithstanding its flaws, the DBA’s no-fault system
is vastly superior to an uncertain tort-based system for providing prompt payment to injured contractors, especially in light of the substantial legal and
practical obstacles that tort suits would face.
Accordingly, maintaining the DBA in its current form is the best option
for compensating injured contractors. To relieve the pressure on the Act’s
compensation mechanism, and to ensure the safety of the contractors it protects, as well as that of host nation civilians, the government should adopt a
minimum competence-based certification requirement for private security
contracts. This would bar unscrupulous and incompetent PMCs from the market, keeping their unqualified contractors off the battlefield.
enough to obviate the need for government action. Alternatively, insurers could condition
their DBA policies on the holder’s certification by ISOA, BAPSC, or a similar organization.
273
See DAVID ISENBERG, INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, PRIVATE
MILITARY CONTRACTORS AND U.S. GRAND STRATEGY (2009) (discussing the contracting
process and regulation of PMCs and arguing for better standards and controls).
274
See supra note 97 and accompanying text (discussing DoL’s reforms); supra notes
186–87 and accompanying text (pointing out that DBA claim prompt payments have
increased from 43 percent in 2009 to 67 percent in 2013).
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While this would result in greater prices in the short term, the fact that the
industry is already moving in this direction through organizations like ISOA
and BAPSC indicates that they are responsive to economic pressure for higher
ethical standards. The government can boost this trend and avail itself of an
already-established self-enforcing credentialing process by simply requiring
certification by organizations like ISOA or BAPSC as the benchmark of
PMC competence. Over time, these organizations’ standards would become
the industry standard such that the supply of competent PMCs should actually
increase, bring down total costs of their employment, and reduce the current
difficulties faced by the DBA.

